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The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asian
countries during the Great East Asian War
was a cataclysmic experience for indigenous
peoples. Japan's wartime slogan "Asia for the
Asiatics," embodied in the concept of the Great
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, bolstered in-
cipient nationalist fervor in Southeast Asia and
gave its leaders confidence in challenging the
political control of the Western powers. In
recent years Western scholars of Asian affairs
have attempted to reevaluate the meaning of
Japan's Great East Asian Co-Prosperity—a
task made possible by the increasing avail-
ability of wartime documents which have been
scattered in archives and in private possession.
The book under review—a study of wartime
Japanese-Indian cooperation and its signifi-
cance for India—utilized such materials, supple-
mented by the author's interviews with former
Japanese and Indian military and civilian
officials involved in the alliance. In preparing
the book, Professor Lebra researched at the
Netaji Research Bureau in Calcutta, the ar-
chives of the Indian Government and of the
Defense Ministry in New Delhi, the archives
of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and of the
Japanese Self Defense Agency, the Japanese
National Diet Library, and the Keio University
Library in Tokyo. As a result, the author has
produced the first comprehensive monograph,
to the reviewer's knowledge, that deals with
the subject in depth.
This book analyzes the formation, develop-
ment, and tragic end of the wartime Japanese-
Indian alliance capped by the death of Suhbas
Chandra Bose, leader of the India National
Army (INA), in an airplane crash three days
after the war ended. The first three chapters
reveal Japanese military's intelligence activities
in Thailand and Malay prior to and during
the Malay Operations. The intelligence agency
known as the F Kikan, charged with the
mission to win over Indian soldiers from
British Indian forces, was headed by Major
Fujiwara Iwaichi, a sincere and idealistic
thirty-three year old staff officer of the Army
General Staff. By the time the Japanese forces
overran Singapore, Fujiwara and his agency
staffed by six officers had succeeded in per-
suading tens of thousands of Indian soldiers
to defect from the British forces. Fujiwara
gave them an opportunity to fight for India's
independence. Among the defectors was Cap-
tain Mohan Singh, who was to become the
leader of the first INA, formally inaugurated
at Singapore on February 12, 1942.
Ironically, the organization of the INA
snarled relations between INA leaders and the
Japanese military command in Tokyo (Chap-
ters 4 through 6.) Mohan Singh, who from
the time of his surrender had insisted on the
independence of the INA from Japanese con-
trol, equality with the Japanese Army as an
allied force, and recognition of the INA as a
revolutionary army, was dissatisfied with the
leadership of Rash Behari Bose, the leader of
the Indian Independence League (HL), which
the Japanese had supported before the INA
was organized. Mohan Singh regarded R. B.
Bose as a Japanese puppet who was so sub-
servient to the Japanese military that he could
not articulate the INA demands to the Japan-
ese military central command. Factionalism
within the IIL-INA alliance and personal jeal-
ously plagued Japanese-Indian relations. As
Professor Lebra correctly points out, the de-
teriorating relations between the Army Cen-
tral Command and the INA was the result of
Japanese policy toward India and of disagree-
ment between the two as to the role of the
INA in the larger military consideration. Ja-
pan had viewed India as only a peripheral
member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and had
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conceived no invasion plans until the fall of
1942, and then only to be quickly cancelled.
Furthermore, the Japanese attitude toward the
INA was that the latter's support would pro-
vide a convenient bulwark to Japanese propa-
ganda, particularly in fostering anti-British sen-
timent in Southeast Asia and India. Lastly, the
Japanese military did not want to see the INA
develop into a large fighting force because of
the problems of equipping such an army and
of its unproven quality as a fighting unit.
Japanese policy was to develop the INA into
an intelligent guerilla network to defend
Burma and the western border of the Great
East Asia-Co-Prosperity Sphere. These Japa-
nese objectives were evident in the reorgani-
zation of the F Kikan in the spring of 1942,
when it was taken over by the Iwakuro Kikan,
headed by Colonel Iwakuro Hideo, the
founder of the Nakano Army Intelligence
School and an espionage operation expert. Un-
der Iwakuro, training programs for propa-
ganda and sabotage missions behind enemy
lines were expanded. Thereafter, it was only
a matter of time before the two irreconcilable
forces were to come into open conflict. Mohan
Singh resigned his command in protest in
December 1942, and was later taken into
custody. Fujiwara, though sympathetic to Mo-
han Singh, was helpless, for the matter was
out of his hands; only Tokyo could settle a
question of such politico-military magnitude.
Thus came the end of the first INA after only
one year of existence.
The INA, however, was resurrected with
the arrival (in Singapore from Germany via
Tokyo) of the Netaji Suhbas Chandra Bose,
whose charismatic personality and persuasive
tongue captivated reluctant and skeptical Jap-
anese leaders, including Premier Tojo Hideki.
The Netaji's appearance in Singapore in July
1943 also resuscitated demoralized INA sol-
diers. The story of this second phase of the
Japanese-Indian alliance, the Japanese military
planning for Imphal, its execution, and the
tragic demise of the INA as the result of the
defeat is related in the rest of the book.
The importance of Bose to Japan was in-
dicated by the establishment of the Hikari
Kikan headed first by Col. Yamamoto Bin
and later by Major-General Isoda Saburo as
liaison officers between the Japanese govern-
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ment and the Free India Provisional Govern-
ment that the Netaji established. As Profes-
sor Lebra rightly argues, Bose was in part
responsible for forcing the Japanese military to
arrive at the decision to launch the ill-pre-
pared and ill-fated Impha Operations in Oc-
tober 1944. The operations were as much
political as military. The political nature was
graphically revealed by General Kawabe Shoze,
Commander of the Burma Area Army and an
admirer of Bose, in the following passage, writ-
ten when it was apparent that the Operations
were a disaster: "The fate of Japan-India rela-
tions hinges upon the Operations, and I keep
saying to myself that I shall commit a double
suicide with Bose." Bose died in an airplane
crash on his way to Russia after the war was
over. Even after reasonable evidence has been
established for his death, a legend persists in
India today that Bose is still alive somewhere.
Professor Lebra weighed materials carefully
and analyzed them judiciously in considering
issues and policies involved. In so doing, the
author has succeeded in putting the role of the
INA and the Japanese in proper perspective.
There are, unfortunately, numerous mis-
prints and awkward sentences in the Japanese
translation, though none is serious. Professor
Lebra should be congratulated for having pro-
duced this valuable and handsome book. For
the price of less than U.S. $5.00, the book is a
bargain. Those who do not read Japanese will
be glad to know that an English edition of the
book is to be published in the near future.
YOJI AKASHI
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A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui.
BY HUGH D. R. BAKER. California: Stan-
ford University Press, 1968. xiv, 237 pp.
Glossary, Index, Figures, Maps, Tables,
Illustrations. $8.50.
This volume is an ethno-historical study of
a lineage village in the New Territories.
Professor Baker has produced an interesting
interdisciplinary work utilizing interviews and
participant-observation techniques familiar to
anthropologists and also drawing heavily on
local gazetters, government reports, and lineage
documents and memorabilia. He is thus able
to follow the Liao lineage from their original
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